N/A - CVE-2024-31144

Executive Summary

Informations
Name	CVE-2024-31144	First vendor Publication	2025-02-14
Vendor	Cve	Last vendor Modification	2025-02-18

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3

Cvss vector : N/A
Overall CVSS Score	NA
Base Score	NA	Environmental Score	NA
impact SubScore	NA	Temporal Score	NA
Exploitabality Sub Score	NA

Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2

Cvss vector :
Cvss Base Score	N/A	Attack Range	N/A
Cvss Impact Score	N/A	Attack Complexity	N/A
Cvss Expoit Score	N/A	Authentication	N/A
Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores

Detail

For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see:

https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview

Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs).

The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata (e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another host).

Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata.

The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order) each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and is restored from.

In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner, and should not be trusted by the host administrator.

A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata backup.

A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc.