Executive Summary
Informations | |||
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Name | CVE-2024-44991 | First vendor Publication | 2024-09-04 |
Vendor | Cve | Last vendor Modification | 2024-10-09 |
Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3
Cvss vector : CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | |||
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Overall CVSS Score | 5.5 | ||
Base Score | 5.5 | Environmental Score | 5.5 |
impact SubScore | 3.6 | Temporal Score | 5.5 |
Exploitabality Sub Score | 1.8 | ||
Attack Vector | Local | Attack Complexity | Low |
Privileges Required | Low | User Interaction | None |
Scope | Unchanged | Confidentiality Impact | None |
Integrity Impact | None | Availability Impact | High |
Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores |
Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2
Cvss vector : | |||
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Cvss Base Score | N/A | Attack Range | N/A |
Cvss Impact Score | N/A | Attack Complexity | N/A |
Cvss Expoit Score | N/A | Authentication | N/A |
Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores |
Detail
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch Its possible that two threads call tcp_sk_exit_batch() concurrently, once from the cleanup_net workqueue, once from a task that failed to clone a new netns. In the latter case, error unwinding calls the exit handlers in reverse order for the 'failed' netns. tcp_sk_exit_batch() calls tcp_twsk_purge(). Problem is that since commit b099ce2602d8 ("net: Batch inet_twsk_purge"), this function picks up twsk in any dying netns, not just the one passed in via exit_batch list. This means that the error unwind of setup_net() can "steal" and destroy timewait sockets belonging to the exiting netns. This allows the netns exit worker to proceed to call WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount)); without the expected 1 -> 0 transition, which then splats. At same time, error unwind path that is also running inet_twsk_purge() will splat as well: WARNING: .. at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 ... ... because refcount_dec() of tw_refcount unexpectedly dropped to 0. This doesn't seem like an actual bug (no tw sockets got lost and I don't see a use-after-free) but as erroneous trigger of debug check. Add a mutex to force strict ordering: the task that calls tcp_twsk_purge() blocks other task from doing final _dec_and_test before mutex-owner has removed all tw sockets of dying netns. |
Original Source
Url : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-44991 |
CPE : Common Platform Enumeration
Sources (Detail)
Alert History
Date | Informations |
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2025-01-08 03:04:56 |
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2025-01-07 03:04:29 |
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2024-12-25 03:03:07 |
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2024-12-12 03:06:03 |
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2024-11-23 03:03:04 |
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2024-11-22 03:01:15 |
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2024-11-20 02:59:34 |
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2024-11-14 02:59:53 |
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2024-11-09 02:59:53 |
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2024-10-26 02:57:16 |
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2024-10-25 02:59:09 |
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2024-10-23 02:58:21 |
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2024-10-09 21:27:52 |
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2024-09-05 17:27:24 |
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2024-09-05 00:27:25 |
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