Executive Summary



This vulnerability is currently undergoing analysis and not all information is available. Please check back soon to view the completed vulnerability summary
Informations
Name CVE-2025-21737 First vendor Publication 2025-02-27
Vendor Cve Last vendor Modification 2025-02-27

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v3

Cvss vector : N/A
Overall CVSS Score NA
Base Score NA Environmental Score NA
impact SubScore NA Temporal Score NA
Exploitabality Sub Score NA
 
Calculate full CVSS 3.0 Vectors scores

Security-Database Scoring CVSS v2

Cvss vector :
Cvss Base Score N/A Attack Range N/A
Cvss Impact Score N/A Attack Complexity N/A
Cvss Expoit Score N/A Authentication N/A
Calculate full CVSS 2.0 Vectors scores

Detail

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix memory leak in ceph_mds_auth_match()

We now free the temporary target path substring allocation on every possible branch, instead of omitting the default branch. In some cases, a memory leak occured, which could rapidly crash the system (depending on how many file accesses were attempted).

This was detected in production because it caused a continuous memory growth, eventually triggering kernel OOM and completely hard-locking the kernel.

Relevant kmemleak stacktrace:

unreferenced object 0xffff888131e69900 (size 128):
comm "git", pid 66104, jiffies 4295435999
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
76 6f 6c 75 6d 65 73 2f 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 volumes/containe
72 73 2f 67 69 74 65 61 2f 67 69 74 65 61 2f 67 rs/gitea/gitea/g
backtrace (crc 2f3bb450):
[] __kmalloc_noprof+0x359/0x510
[] ceph_mds_check_access+0x5bf/0x14e0 [ceph]
[] ceph_open+0x312/0xd80 [ceph]
[] do_dentry_open+0x456/0x1120
[] vfs_open+0x79/0x360
[] path_openat+0x1de5/0x4390
[] do_filp_open+0x19c/0x3c0
[] do_sys_openat2+0x141/0x180
[] __x64_sys_open+0xe5/0x1a0
[] do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x210
[] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

It can be triggered by mouting a subdirectory of a CephFS filesystem, and then trying to access files on this subdirectory with an auth token using a path-scoped capability:

$ ceph auth get client.services
[client.services]
key = REDACTED
caps mds = "allow rw fsname=cephfs path=/volumes/"
caps mon = "allow r fsname=cephfs"
caps osd = "allow rw tag cephfs data=cephfs"

$ cat /proc/self/mounts
services@[REDACTED].cephfs=/volumes/containers /ceph/containers ceph rw,noatime,name=services,secret=,ms_mode=prefer-crc,mount_timeout=300,acl,mon_addr=[REDACTED]:3300,recover_session=clean 0 0

$ seq 1 1000000 | xargs -P32 --replace={} touch /ceph/containers/file-{} && \
seq 1 1000000 | xargs -P32 --replace={} cat /ceph/containers/file-{}

[ idryomov: combine if statements, rename rc to path_matched and make
it a bool, formatting ]

Original Source

Url : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-21737

Sources (Detail)

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/146109fe936ac07f8f60cd6267543688985b96bc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b6086c5efe5c7bd6e0eb440d96c26ca0d20d9d7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b7d93db450e9d8ead80d75e2a303248f1528c35
Source Url

Alert History

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0
Date Informations
2025-02-27 09:20:31
  • First insertion